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This study revolves around two interrelated topics, either of 
which would actually merit its own book. The first deals with the 
discourse of anti-relativism as it is present in official statements 
of the Catholic Church. It is often said that political philosophy, 
which Ian Shapiro called “narcissistic”, has nowadays become 
encapsulated in its own canon and self-commentaries [Shapiro, 
Ian. Problems, Methods, and Theories in the Study of Politics, Or 
What Is Wrong with Political Science and What to Do about It. In 
Political Theory 30:4 (August 2002), 596-619; 596]. The project 
that brings our attention to the body of texts criticizing liberal 
democracy from an intellectually elaborate point of view opens up 
our political philosophical discussion to the voices which are labeled 
“traditionalist” and thus are left unheeded. Historical analysis of 
how the concept of relativism has become so prominent in Catholic 
political theory is, however, only a foundation for the second part of 
the book, which is an analytical study of “the challenge represented 
for democratic theory by the idea that democratic regimes need to 
be complemented by the reference to a set of absolute moral or 
political truths in order to avoid degenerating into a form of tyranny 
or totalitarianism” (p. 6). The focus on the Catholic doctrine is 
explained by the facts that, on the one hand, it is in Catholic teaching 
that we find the most sophisticated formulations of anti-relativism
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discourse, and, on the other hand, there emerged “a sort of inter-
denominational division of labor whereby Catholic apologists 
provide the intellectual foundations, while Protestant organizations 
supply the grassroots support, for a set of essentially convergent 
positions. Thus, the Vatican’s formulations of the discourse of anti-
relativism can be considered exemplary of a much broader range 
of arguments raised from a variety of religious standpoints” (p. 8).
 The first part of the book offers us penetrating insights into the historical 
dynamic of the notion of relativism. The original use of this concept is 
traced back to the encyclical letter Humanum Genus promulgated by 
Pope Leo XIII in 1884.  Pope Leo XIII attacked freemasonry’s “endeavor 
to obtain equality and community of all goods by the destruction of every 
distinction of rank and property” (p. 35). The dissolution of the Church’s 
authority and actual separation of church and state, in his opinion, will 
inevitably result in moral decline and anarchy, culminating in tyranny. 
The standard criticism of democracy’s susceptibility to tyranny, which 
dates back to Plato, is linked here with the views of the intransigentist 
reaction to the French revolution. Rejection of rank and authority in 
society, disregard for the transcendent in religion, and the elevation of 
human beings to being the sole measure of the true and the good are 
all subsumed under the introduced concept of relativism and detected 
in the political form of liberal democracy. Instead of the intransigentist 
“blanket rejection of modernity,” however, “by focusing the Church’s 
critical attention on a single term, ultimately traceable to an expression 
of the active impulse of the city of Man in human history, Leo XIII was 
able to implicitly carve out space for the recognition that there also 
exist other aspects of the modern world that are not tied to relativism 
or the freemasonry, with which the Church can come to terms. Hence, 
paradoxically, the focalization on the notion of relativism succeeded in 
opening up the conceptual space for the possibility of a compromise with 
the aspects of modernity that had been left out from this critique” (p. 39).
During the next stage - between the First World War and the end of the 
Cold War - the main assault was directed at communism, later renamed 
totalitarianism, which “almost completely overshadowed the discourse 
of anti-relativism” (p. 43), and, in a way, allowed the Church first to come 
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to terms with fascist regimes and later to side with liberal democracies. 
“Hence the discourse of anti-relativism was effectively silenced throughout 
the duration of the Cold War in order to avoid any ambiguity over the 
side that the Church had chosen to endorse” (p. 47). The criticism of 
relativism, however, “began to be employed as a conceptual weapon for 
dealing with internal dissidence within the Catholic Church itself” (p. 49); 
first and foremost, “as a strategy for reasserting the principle of authority 
within the Catholic Church against the perceived destructive effects of 
the Second Vatican Council” (pp. 53–54). 
 After the collapse of the Soviet block, the threat of militant atheism 
disappeared and the discourse of anti-relativism re-emerges. Since 
the political form of liberal democracy stands now unchallenged 
by any alternative power, its criticism has been re-focused by the 
Church leaders – Popes John Paul II and Benedict XVI – and is now 
emphatically limited to the domain of morality. The new targets are 
false freedom, tolerance and “knowledge through dialogue” (p. 66). 
The ancient argument against democracy, that cited its vulnerability to 
demagogues and hence to tyranny, is now rephrased by reference to 
new evils. In these documents it is now claimed that democracy without 
moral foundation in absolute truth will degenerate into totalitarianism. 
“One of the most important functions of the Catholic discourse of anti-
relativism had historically been to mediate the Church’s relation with 
the political form of democracy. Here, however, the link becomes 
explicit: the central claim is that, like freedom, democracy requires 
“guidance,” because if it is grounded merely in a form of philosophical 
relativism, it is deprived of any sense of the necessary moral limits that 
must be imposed on the people’s exercise of power over themselves 
and therefore runs the risk of converting into its opposite” (p. 62).
 Cardinal Ratzinger (later Pope Benedict XVI), in his debate with 
Habermas, stresses the necessity to subordinate the exercise of power 
to the requirements of the law and recognizes that now democracy is 
the sole form for legitimate political authority, yet, it is not capable of 
being the sole source of norms. Democracy has in itself no a priori 
limits to power and can be corrupted easily, unless its legislature is 
subject to external criterion, which, as Cardinal argues, is the notion 
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of human rights. The notion of human rights replaces the traditional 
category of natural law, because “the idea of natural law presupposed a 
conception of ‘nature’ in which nature and reason interlock. The victory 
of the theory of evolution has meant the end of this view of nature” 
(cited on p. 74). Therefore, we must look for those forces within nature, 
which represent rationality, that is human beings, and if rationality is the 
essence of humankind, their rights are the last rational foundation for 
just law and legitimate power. The fight against relativism is continued 
by Popes Benedict XVI and Francis I with the same vigor and targets 
‘unlimited freedom’, ‘hostile tolerance or distrust of truth’. In sum, we 
observe that criticism of relativism by the Catholic leaders entails 
criticism of democracy not founded on absolute moral truth, we, then, 
have to conclude that “religion is not incompatible with democracy but 
actually required by it” (p. 85).
 The second chapter offers a conceptual analysis of the notions 
upon which the Church’s discourse of anti-relativism hinges: relativism, 
absolute truth, authority, freedom, and totalitarianism. It is clear that 
relativism is often confused by its critics – whether intentionally or not – 
with nihilism or with indifferentism and it is presented as a dogmatic 
postulation of absolute relativity. Relativism may not imply an actual 
rejection of or indifference to all values; and it does not require the 
exclusion of the truth from our moral reasoning. “While not renouncing 
taking a stand and formulating moral judgments, therefore, the 
relativist is conscious that, from a second-order perspective, his stand 
and judgment remain relative to the specific cultural and discursive 
framework from which they emerge” (pp. 93-94).
 The claim that without absolute moral truth political society will 
degenerate into tyranny or totalitarianism does not actually give us 
an answer to the questions whether the absolute moral truth exists, 
whether it can be known, and whether it can be grasped uniformly 
and unanimously. Moreover this argument implies that religion is, in 
fact, instrumental in maintaining political community regardless of its 
actual relation to truth, that is, as a civic religion. This implication may 
be offensive to true believers and seems rather Machiavellian. On the 
other hand, once we accept the fact that there are many believers who 
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claim knowledge of the absolute truth and are unlikely to compromise 
on it, the violent conflict between these ‘truth communities’ becomes 
inevitable.
 The legitimate exercise of power presupposes the notion of 
authority. The interpretations of this notion stem from at least two 
separate but sometimes intermingling traditions. The first tradition, 
inherited from Platonism, derives all legitimacy of rule from the privileged 
access to truth, while whilst the second – a Roman juridical tradition – 
sees legitimacy as being grounded in contract relations, in which “two 
individuals can agree to sign a contract whereby one counts as the 
author of the actions of the other, and the latter can accordingly be said 
to act with authority of the former” (p. 106). Yet, social contract theories 
normally compound two elements: “pactum unionis, whereby isolated 
individuals reciprocally contract with one another to form a social unit” 
and “pactum subiectionis whereby an already constituted political entity 
agrees to submit to the authority of the government” (p. 108). For true 
democratic authority the “idea of pactum unionis constituted horizontally 
through reciprocal agreements among human beings is sustainable on 
its own and does not need to be tied to the idea of pactum subiectionis 
introducing the vertical dimension of the distinction between rulers and 
ruled” (p. 109). Thus, a certain similarity of presuppositions is present 
in Catholic discourse of anti-relativism and in many social contract 
theories. The presupposition that stability and order can be based only 
on subjection to higher authority is undermined if we rely on “a properly 
democratic conception of authority.” No external pole to legitimate and 
to regulate the workings of democracy is conceptually needed, because 
social contract retains its internal dynamic, that is, “an iterated practice, 
constantly renewed through an ongoing process of negotiation among 
the members of a social order” (p. 112), and “does not work top-down 
but bottom-up” (p. 109).
 While it is clear that the Church advocates the principle of authority 
and criticizes freedom, it should be taken into account that the Church 
operates on its own notion of freedom. Unlike ‘relativist’ freedom which 
has no content and, in fact, implies that human beings can do whatever 
they want, Christian notion of freedom relies on the acceptance of 
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man’s creation in the image of God and, therefore, “when human 
beings obey the commandments of God they are not really submitting 
to an extraneous authority, but rather complying with the highest part of 
their own intrinsic nature” (p. 117). Obeying God thus means not being 
unfree, but being free in its true meaning, being properly autonomous. 
Invernizzi Acetti here claims that “while recognizing its astuteness, I 
nonetheless judge this argument to amount to a form of conceptual 
manipulation, because it effectively inverts the meaning traditionally 
ascribed to the concept of freedom” (p. 117) and “effectively deprives 
the enemies of the Catholic Church of the terms to formulate their own 
position” (p. 118).
 The idea that freedom should be a part of the hierarchical system 
of values which alone can lend it substantive content is developed by 
Pope John Paul II in the encyclical Veritatis Splendor and by Cardinal 
Ratzinger in his “What is Truth? The Significance of Ethical and 
Religious Values in a Pluralist Society”, in which the latter defines the 
content of freedom as safeguarding human rights, that is, social peace 
and harmony. Here I believe the criticism of the Church’s discourse is 
the weakest as Invernizzi Acetti argues that this conception of freedom 
does not stem from the internal logic of the principle of freedom, it 
does not have to be consistent with other values or even with itself. 
Consequently, “it is not freedom that requires a content, but the 
Church’s project of inscribing it within its own hierarchical system of 
values, which introduces this necessity from outside. The paradox 
involved in the idea that the content of a free action can be determined 
logically a priori therefore proves to be not a consequence of the 
meaning traditionally ascribed to the concept of freedom itself, but 
rather the result of the Church’s own contradictory goals with respect to 
it” (p. 120). Leaving aside the ulterior motives of the Church’s argument 
alluded to by Invernizzi Acetti, it should be noted that freedom is never 
disentangled from other values. In liberal discourse, it is inseparable 
from the value of equality, these are twin values of modern polities, 
each supporting and limiting another, as the author recognizes in his 
own argument, and adds tolerance (pp. 176-177). If freedom is not a 
bare capacity to act without interference, which is merely the absence of 
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physical obstacles, then the notion of freedom implies acting in relation 
to and in communication with other human beings, it will necessarily be 
entwined with other values and often be subordinate to them. 
 In the third chapter, the interpretations of Rawls and Habermas, 
who provide us with an alternative to grounding democracy in absolute 
moral truths, demonstrate that both are inadequate for “developing 
a fully convincing response to Catholic discourse of anti-relativism”. 
The cultural relativism is taken into account, but Invernizzi Acetti’s 
aspiration is “to explore whether a theory of democracy can do away 
with the orientation to an idea of moral truth altogether” (p. 161).
 The last chapter deals with an original defense of a relativist 
conception of democracy based on an interpretation and extrapolation 
of Hans Kelsen’s connection between democracy and relativism. 
Generally, the argument can be summarized as follows: “the absence 
of any absolute ground for political justification can itself function as the 
ground for a specific conception of democracy. ... this absence implies 
that all exercises of coercive power and attempts at discrimination 
between different substantive conceptions of the good or the right must 
be considered illegitimate, unless they are consented to by the individuals 
to whom they apply. Since democracy can be understood as a political 
regime based on the principle of consent among equals, it follows that a 
form of philosophical relativism implying the unavailability of any absolute 
grounds for political justification constitutes a sufficient philosophical 
ground for justifying such a form of democracy” (pp. 212–213). 
 Moreover, Invernizzi Acetti claims “that it is not only possible but 
necessary to be a relativist about one’s own relativism - which implies 
that positing such a form of relativism as the philosophical foundation for 
the legitimacy of democratic institutions amounts to a way of grounding 
their legitimacy not in a figure of the absolute, but in something that is 
inherently relative; that is, relativism itself” (p. 213). Now if we recollect 
the criticism of conceptual inversion and manipulation that Invernizzi 
Acetti directed at Catholic intellectuals for their interpretation of the 
notion of freedom, this summary seems to be doing the same. Are 
we to infer that to be a democrat one has to be a relativist? We claim 
that this conception of democracy is inclusive and safe from extremes 
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of both secularism, which excludes religion from public discourse, 
and post-secularism, which privileges religion, but this ‘middle path’ 
conception of democracy no less suppresses the aspiration of religions 
to be what they are –- belief in the absolute and in universally valid 
morality. On the last pages of his book, Invernizzi Acetti recognizes this 
objection, but brushes it away: “this objection misses the point of the 
overall conception of democracy I have sought to articulate and defend 
in this book. For the latter has never aimed to be absolutely ‘neutral’ 
between all possible religious views and opinions, but rather to give 
expression to a specific set of substantive values that are assumed 
to follow logically from the assumption of a form of philosophical 
relativism” (p. 219).
 Finally, the actual response to the concern that democracy is 
amenable to tyranny is rather homely, but nevertheless strictly to 
the point: there are no risk-free polities. If democracy votes itself into 
another political form, it may be a tragedy to a committed democrat, but 
it in no way de-legitimizes democracy.
